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ANT ROUTING ALGORITHM FOR THE LIGHTNING NETWORK
CYRIL GRUNSPAN AND RICARDO PE´REZ-MARCO
Abstract. We propose a decentralized routing algorithm that can be implemented
in Bitcoin Lightning Network. All nodes in the network contribute equally to path
searching. The algorithm is inspired from ant path searching algorithms.
1. Introduction
Bitcoin’s network is a decentralized peer-to-peer payment network [6] that allows
programmable transactions. Transactions are not instantaneous, and the current
protocol does not scale to thousands of transactions per second as it will be necessary
to scale to a worldwide payment system. The Lightning Network is a second layer
payment network with these properties. Security of the Lightning Network relies on
the Bitcoin network. We want to build such an extension preserving decentralization
and confidentiality of transactions.
Bitcoin scripting language (and proposed extensions) allows to open one way or
bidirectional payment channels ([2], [5], [7], [1]) so that two individuals can per-
form peer-to-peer almost instantaneous, anonymous and secure off-chain transactions.
Only the Initial Commitment Transaction and the final Settlement Transaction need
to be registered in Bitcoin’s blockchain.
Hashed Timelocked Contracts (HTLC) can be used to compose payment channels,
therefore allowing the emergence of a second layer network for instantaneous and
more anonymous payments: The Lightning Network.
The Lightning Network, LN from now on, was described in [7]. Its ambition is to
scale to an instantaneous decentralized worlwide payment network with minimal fees,
and is currently being tested and implemented.
In the original white paper [7] the routing problem is only addressed in section
8.4 where only some tips are given about possible routing algorithms. The belief is
that routing tables are necessary for large operators as for current Internet routing
algorithms as BGP or Cjdns protocols. A proposal for implementation was presented
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in [8]. We refer to this article for historical background on the routing problem and
ideas proposed and discussed among developers. In [8] an algorithm called “Flare”
is proposed that uses routing tables and beacon nodes that have a richer information
about the geometry of the LN network.
The existence of a group of beacon nodes (even when selected randomly and re-
newed regularly) presents a threat to decentralisation. Indeed, even the global knowl-
edge of the geometry of the network can be a vector of attack.
The main challenge is to implement a resilient, anti-fragile, secure, anonymous,
scalable and decentralized routing algorithm.
A necessary condition for perfect decentralisation is to have all nodes performing
the same tasks and having access to the same information. Therefore we want to
avoid “beacon nodes” as well as any privileged role of a node.
The main inspiration for our algorithm comes from ant behavior. Ant colonies
exhibit a superior performance in their “food finding” algorithms. Mathematically
speaking, they employ a “balayage technique” of the geometry of their natural habitat
in order to collect food. Only the best performers of these algorithms have survived
natural selection over millions of years. This is an important reason to consider seri-
ously these algorithms from a mathematical and geometrical point of view. Important
research has been conducted by biologists, but also by other scientists and mathe-
maticians. For general background we refer the reader to [3]1. One of the distinctive
idea of ant algorithms is the use of pheromones in order to leave a “trace” of their
passage and marking the food collecting routes. A natural routing algorithm is at
work. The idea of “leaving a trace” appears as well in greek mythology in the myth
of Ariadne’s thread in order to solve in a practical efficient way the “path exiting
problem” in a labyrinth.
We present in this article a routing algorithm where we implement similar ideas in
order to achieve maximal decentralization. We present here only a first draft of the
algorithm. Further numerical simulations are necessary to evaluate the performance
and scalability of the algorithm.
An interesting feature of the algorithm is that it has potential learning capabilities:
It can adjust to the dynamic geometry of the network and can improve its performance
over time (see 9).
1Even in section 6 we can find a discussion on “ant routing algorithms” that, although more
complicate, have the same flavor and share some ideas with the algorithm presented in this article.
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2. Preliminaries on the Lightning Network.
As described in the white paper [7] the Ligthning Network (LN) is an aggregation
of payment channels that can be composed. For the purpose of the present article we
don’t care about the specifics of the payment channels (if they are bidirectional or
only one-way channels, etc). The payment channel network is assumed to be richly
and randomly connected, as for the Bitcoin network.
We assume that on top of the LN there is a separate, but richer, fast communication
network. This means that a pair of participants (nodes of the network) with an open
payment channel also do have a communication channel, but pair’s of participants
without a direct payment channel can have a communication channel. This will be
the case between Alice and Bob when both are part of the LN and want to make
a transaction from Alice to Bob. The route finding algorithm operates at the level
of the communication network. The speed of communications is one of the main
bottlenecks for the speed of the LN.
What we need to know and that we will use from the LN is that payment channels
can be composed, once we know a payment path. Also payment channels support
a maximal volume per transaction. This is a particular feature of the LN and it
is discussed in Section 6. We postpone a full analysis of possible misbehaviors and
attacks on the LN, that deserves by itself a lengthly and careful discussion.
3. Simple ant routing algorithm.
Alice wants to pay Bob a certain amount in Bitcoin through the LN network by
composing already existent payment channels. We can assume that the network
is composed of bidirectional channels (although this is not necessary as discussed in
Section 8) and we can even have a mixture of unidirectional or bidirectional channels).
We assume that a communication channels are open between neighboring nodes. In
this section we describe how the network finds a path between Alice and Bob. This
is only, for now, the simplest geometric problem. In this section we don’t address
the limitation by the volume of the channels (you can assume that all channel are
of a volume larger than the payment), nor we address the fee question (assume free
transmission). Later on we consider channel payment volume limitations and fees
(see Sections 7 and 6).
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a large random number. For example, Alice and Bob
choose a random 128 bit numbers, R(A) and R(B) and exchange them in a
secured way.
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(2) Alice concatenates the bit 0, and the hash2 R = h(R(A)_R(B)) to get a
pheromone seed S(A) = 0_R and communicates S(A) to its immediate neigh-
bors in the LN with whom she has an open payment channel.
(3) Bob concatenates the bit 1, R(A) and R(B) to get a pheromone seed S(B) =
1_R and communicates it to its neighbors in the LN with whom he has an
open payment channel.
(4) Alice waits from an answer from its neighbors indicating her that a path has
been found by the network.
(5) Bob waits to have news from Alice that a path has been found.
If S is a pheromone seed, we denote S ′ the “derived seed” without the appended
first bit, that is, the hash R. (thus S = 0_S ′ or S = 1_S ′). If S = 0_S ′ (resp.
S = 1_S ′) we denote by S¯ the “conjugate” seed S¯ = 1_S ′ (resp. S¯ = 0_S ′).
The nodes perform the following tasks (on top of a possible payment task if they
are Alice or Bob).
(1) Each nodes reserves a fast access memory space for the routing tasks. We
refer to this as the “LNmempool” of the node3.
(2) Each node keeps in memory a numbered list of neighbors in the LN together
with the relevant information about its payment channel(s) opened with them.
Also about historical performance of payments through these neighbors.
(3) When a node receives a pheromone seed S, it checks if S ′ is not a derived seed
of a seed already stored in the LNmempool.
(4) If S ′ is not found, then it stores S in the LNmempool together with the
information about the neighbor that has communicated S (the “transmitter
neighbor”). Then it broadcasts S to the other neighbors.
(5) If S ′ is found, then it checks if S is stored.
(a) If S is stored it adds the information about the new transmitter neighbor.
(b) If S is not stored it means that S¯ is stored, so a matching occurs.
(6) When a matching occurs, the node concatenates the bit 0 to S (resp. S¯) and
constructs a “matched seed” Sm = 0
_S (resp. S¯m = 0
_S¯ and sends it to the
neighbors from which it received S (resp. S¯). Note that “matched seeds” are
one bit longer than pheromone seed. The node keeps track of the neighbors
having transmitted the unmatched seed.
(7) When a node receives a matched seed Sm it broadcasts it back to the neighbors
that send to him the unmatched seeds and keeps track of them.
2For example h can be the commonly used SHA256 in Bitcoin protocol. We take a hash in order
to preserve a shared secret by Alice and Bob that they can used to prove that they are the originators
of the transaction and can serve extensions of the algorithm.
3Not to be confused with Bitcoins’s network’s nodes mempool.
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Following this procedure, Alice will receive back several matched seeds that will
correspond to different possible payment paths. She chooses one, say Sm, and con-
catenates a further 0 bit creating a confirmed seed Sc = 0
_Sm that she sends back
to the neighbor that send her the matched seed. Confirmed seeds are one bit longer
than matched seeds, and two bits longer than pheromone seeds. The nodes broadcast
back the confirmed seed to the corresponding neighbor from which he received the
matched seed until they reach the node that did the match. This node continues the
broadcasting back of the confirmed seed until it reaches Bob. Once Alice receives
from Bob the confirmation of the payment path, she starts the conditional payment
chain as described in [7] and the transaction will be completed.
Once the payment have been done, the nodes erase the data corresponding to the
confirmed seed. Also, after some threshold time τ , the nodes drop all data (matched
and unmatched) older than τ . If no path is found after this threshold time, the
“path finding” request of Alice and Bob is erased from the network. In that way the
LNmempool keeps a controlled size. Each node can decide its own threshold time.
4. Precisions on the simple routing algorithm.
The simplified version described in the previous section needs to be made more
precise for a proper transmission back of matched and confirmed seeds. It is important
that the route gets “locked” so that an intermediate node does not mix different
confirmed and matched seeds corresponding to different matchings. For this reason
we introduce an Id of the matching. Also we want to minimize the information
broadcast to the whole network. With this in mind, we propose:
(1) We append a counter to pheromone seeds. Each time the pheromone seed is
transmitted the counter is increased by 1.
(2) Nodes only rebroadcast pheromone seeds if the counter is lower than previously
seen for this pheromone seed.
(3) When a matching occurs, the node matching the pheromone seeds appends a
“matching Id” which is a random number.
(4) Nodes broadcast back the matched seed so that the counter decreases and
store the matching Id and the corresponding neighbors in the path.
(5) Alice will confirm matched seeds and the path will be confirmed using the
matching Id.
Thus when a confirmed seed is received, the Id allows to choose the only next node
in the path without ambiguity. Also, the counter restriction makes that the amount
of pheromone seed data broadcast to the network is reduced. The counter provides
some information about the length of the path which is not suitable. This happens if
the counters is started at 0, but we may decide to start it at some random number to
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conceal that information,. Also we can add a random positive number in some range
and larger than 1 at each step to conceal even more this information.
A node may be tempted to cheat on the counter making it smaller in order to
sabotage or to increase its chances to be selected in the payment path. This may
end-up creating a loop not reaching Alice or Bob, and, if repeated, the neighboring
nodes may mark this node as “non efficient” (see Section 9 on how to select the most
efficient neighbors using the historical data). Also Alice could require the fee to be
proportional to the counter (more on fees in Section 7), which will force this sabotage
strategy to cost on fees to the cheating node. There are also simple procedures that
can be implemented by doing a final round in order to check that nodes are not
cheating on the counter. For example, when Alice confirms the seed and sends it
back to Bob through the path, each node will append a random number, and the full
sequence of random numbers reaches Bob. Bob checks that the number of random
number matches the counter and communicates the whole sequence directly to Alice.
Then Alice sends the whole sequence to the first node in the path that checks that his
random number is the first one, deletes it and sends the remaining sequence to the
second node that checks that his random number is the first remaining one, etc. The
only thing that the cheater node can do is to remove some of the random numbers
in order to dissimulate his cheat on the counter to Bob. But then in the final round
this will be spotted by the first node whose random number was deleted4
5. Properties of the algorithm.
Some of the properties of the algorithm are listed below:
(1) Anonimity: Intermediary nodes have no information about Alice and Bob.
They only have information about the two neighbors in the payment path.
(2) Anonimity: No records of payments are kept.
(3) Anonimity: No node out of the payment path knows about the payment.
(4) Anonimity: No global information about the geometry of the network nor
routing tables needed. Computation load related to updates on routing tables
is avoided. Nobody needs to share information about their neighbors.
(5) Decentralization: All nodes perform the same function and follow the same
rules. In particular, no beacon nodes, and again no routing tables.
(6) Scalability: Pending of numerical simulations, the routing algorithm should
be able to handle thousands of transactions per second.
(7) Instantaneous: Depending on the speed of communication.
4An exception occurs when the cheating node fails to increase the counter and does not add a
random number in the final check. But then the cheating node acts “transparently”.
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As drawback we can cite the intensive computational communication and process-
ing which is typical from a totally decentralized protocol. As described in Section 9,
nodes can improve the efficiency and limit the workload by algorithmically selecting
preferred neighbors from historical data.
6. Channel volume compatibility.
The amount of the transaction should be compatible with the maximal volume of
each payment channel (in the intended payment direction). Thus, some of the paths
found could be incompatible with the payment amount.
In order to ensure that the path found is volume compatible, Alice and Bob add an
“amount field” to their pheromone seed. Then they broadcast it as before. Nodes in
the network only broadcast the pheromone seed to neighbors which whom they have
a volume compatible open payment channel. The rest of the procedure is the same
and we get the subset of paths that are “volume compatible” with the transaction.
Disclosure of the amounts is not suitable for the sake of preservation anonymity
of the transaction. One may think to obfuscation implementations (as for the mim-
blewimble protocol), but for the LN this is not as important as for standard bitcoin
transactions since Alice and Bob may issue multiple transactions dividing the total
amount into micropayments.
7. Fee considerations.
The incentive for nodes to participate in payment paths in the LN are fees for
transaction relay. Each node freely determines the fee it will take to participate in
a payment path. It will deduct the fee amount from the transacted amount. There
are different approaches for the fee treatment. We describe one that is simpler and
straightforward, but leaks some information about the length of the payment path
(that is correlated to the fee). One can obfuscate the fee amount to intermediary
nodes, but it involves a longer procedure.
Fee algorithm. In Alice and Bob’s pheromone seed a “maximum fee field” and a
“current fee field” are added. Alice and Bob initialize the “current fee field” by 0 and
the “maximum fee field” by the maximum amount that Alice is disposed to pay (that
she communicates to Bob). Each time a pheromone seed is broadcast by a network
node, it checks that the current amount and its fee is smaller than the maximal fee
amount, it adds its fee to the amount in the current fee field. It keeps track in the
LNmempool of the neighbor nodes it has communicated the pheromone seed as well
as the corresponding fee amounts.
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When the matching node receives Alice and Bob pheromone seeds, it checks that
the sum of the amounts in both “current fee fields” is smaller than the maximum
amount fee deducted from its own fee. Only under that provision the matching
occurs. The total fee becomes then the sum of the current fee amounts of both
pheromone seeds plus the matching node fee. Then in the matched seed this total
fee amount is included in the “current fee field”. When nodes broadcast the matched
seed they do not change the “current fee field“. The subsequent nodes that relay the
matched seed relay respecting the fee they did indicate prior. If some node intents to
increase the fee, it will be noticed by other nodes, an anomaly will be detected, and
the matched seed will be not be further relayed.
Alice will then received a list of proposed matched seeds with associated fee amounts.
She can then select the lowest fee path (if she wishes).
Obviously, in this setup the matching node can take advantage of his position and
set a maximal fee in order to match the maximal fee. This could be a reward to be
a matching node, but it is not clear that it has any advantage in trying to maximize
its profit since after all there is a competition between the paths discovered and Alice
will probably select the paths with lowest fee, thus maximizing the fee will result in
lower probability for being selected.
8. Hybrid channels.
So far, the only property we have used of payment channels is its transitivity, i.e.
that they can be composed. The algorithm described works as well for unidirectional
channels, and one may even imagine an hybrid LN with swaps between different
blockchains, as long as they can be composed. The algorithm is independent of
the nature of the payment channels as long as they have the usual properties for
composition of payment channels.
9. Self-improvement of the algorithm.
One typical feature of ant path finding algorithms is the self-reinforcement of paths
by the intensity of the pheromone trace. This intensity increases with the number of
ants taking the path. We can propose a similar reinforcement mechanism to boost
the performance of the network.
This can be done with each node assigning a performance benchmark to each
neighbor. In the neighbor tables with information about its payment channels, it can
store historical information, as for example how many payments have been completed,
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or what is the total historical volume having circulated through that channel, etc
Short term and long term ”neighbor performance“ is an important data.
Then each node can selectively broadcast the pheromone seeds according to the
numerical criteria he wishes to implement taking into account its neighbor’s numerical
data. In particular, the comparison between short term and long term data reflects the
dynamical changes of the network and allow the nodes to adjust to the new geometry.
The nodes may also use random algorithms to select their preferred neighbors for
broadcasting pheromone seeds. A Pareto type distribution in terms of an historical
activity index will emulate closely the ant algorithms (see [4] for example).
The historical data can be used not only to detect the best performers neighboring
nodes, but also neighboring nodes that misbehave and sabotage the LN operations.
In particular the ratio between pheromone seeds, and matched seeds transmitted and
final payment paths realized is an important data to detect local misbehavior.
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